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Constitutionalism between normative frameworks
and the socio-legal frameworks of societies
nicole lindstrom
I Introduction
Writing in 2002, Fritz Scharpf warned: ‘the only thing that stands
between the Scandinavian welfare state and the market is not a vote in
the Council of Ministers or in the European Parliament, but merely the
initiation of . . . legal action by potential private competitors before a
national court that is then referred to the European Court of Justice for a
preliminary opinion. In other words, it may happen one day’.1 The day
appeared to come with the referral of two cases to the Court of Justice of
the European Union (ECJ) in 2005: Laval2 and Viking.3 At issue in each
case was whether industrial actions by unions to force ﬁrms to abide by
nationally negotiated collective agreements constituted an infringement
of free movement of services. Coming in the wake of contentious battles
over the Services Directive4 and in ongoing political negotiations leading
up to Lisbon, the cases attracted a great deal of attention as to how the
Court would reconcile these competing economic and social demands.5
Moreover, given that the cases involved employers based in old Member
States (Sweden and Finland) seeking to employ workers from new
Member States (Latvia and Estonia), the cases also exacerbated ongoing
concerns that eastward enlargement would spur a race-to-the-bottom in
1 F. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the challenges of diversity’ JCMS 40
(2002), 657.
2 C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and ors. (Viking)
[2007] ECR I-11767
3 C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finish Seamen’s Union v.
Viking Line ABP and OU Viking Line Eesti (Viking) [2007] ECR I-10779
4 Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market.
5 B. Bercusson, ‘The trade union movement and the European Union: Judgment day’, ELJ
13 (2007), 279.
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wages and social protections. With the ECJ ultimately ruling in favour of
the employers the cases appeared to vindicate concerns raised by Scharpf
and others that direct interventions by the courts pose the most signiﬁ-
cant threat to existing national socio-legal frameworks.
This chapter considers the tensions between market liberalisation and
social protection within the enlarged EU through an in-depth analysis of
the Laval and Viking cases. It suggests that political conﬂicts surround-
ing these two principles are not limited to strategic interactions between
member states seeking to preserve autonomy over social policy against
intrusions by the Court, as some decoupling accounts might suggest.
Instead it pursues a more disaggregated approach that considers how the
cases provided windows of opportunity for a variety of societal actors –
including supranational institutions, governments, and social partners –
to advance two larger agendas: furthering economic liberalisation and
protecting the principles underlying social Europe. With the ECJ ulti-
mately ruling with the employers’ positions, and against the expressed
preferences of most old Member States, the rulings appeared to have
strengthened the position of advocates of further liberalisation in the
enlarged EU. Yet the rulings have also spurred a ‘protective reaction’
among societal actors seeking to retain and strengthen social protections
against unfettered market forces.6 While some of these reactions have
been framed in national terms of strengthening Member State autonomy
over social policy, the cases have also bolstered demands to develop a
more cohesive social policy at the European level.
II Between the Single Market and Social Europe
The revitalisation of the European project in the 1980s involved an
explicit compromise: that the process of abolishing barriers to the free
movement of goods, capital, services and labour (the single market)
would proceed in tandem with maintaining social cohesion within and
across its Member States (Social Europe). The so-called ‘European Social
Model’ (ESM) has been heralded by its proponents as a unique, i.e.
European, response to the competitive pressures of globalisation.7
While the concept of the ESM in the 1980s focused on developing a
common social policy at the European level, in practice the results have
6 K. Polany, The Great Transformation, 2nd edn (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).
7 A. Giddens, P. Diamond and R. Liddle, Global Europe, Social Europe (Cambridge: Polity,
2006).
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beenmore modest. Subsequent constitutional arrangements have tended
to grant EU institutions authority over economic integration while
leaving most matters of social policy to Member States. The separation
of regulatory policies at the European level from redistributive policies at
the domestic level is argued to be both more efﬁcient and legitimate.8
Fundamental decisions concerning taxing and spending are left to dem-
ocratically accountable governments, while technocratic experts at the
EU level focus on creating and overseeing the most effective market-
making policies.
Numerous scholars argue that this tidy decoupling of economic integra-
tion and social integration is unsustainable.9 For one, some claim that
market integration places numerous indirect pressures on social integration
as governments seek to respond to increased economic competition by
weakening national regulations, reducing corporate taxation rates, and
constraining social expenditures.10 Secondly, others argue that national
social policies and practices have been directly challenged by European
institutions on the grounds that they are incompatible with single-market
rules.11 Neither outcome is unexpected to scholars like Gill who argue that
the ‘new constitutionalism’ of the EU is indeed designed to ‘separate eco-
nomic policies from broad accountability in order to make governments
more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less
responsive to popular-democratic forces’.12 European integration, accord-
ing to this view, is a political project that seeks to subsume all states and
societies into a single logic of market competitiveness.13
8 G. Majone, ‘The common sense of European integration’, JEPP 13 (2006) 607;
A. Moravcsik, ‘Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’, JCMS 40 (2002), 603.
9 Scharpf (n. 1 above), p. 657; F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); C. Offe, ‘The European model of “social”
capitalism: Can it survive European integration?’, The Journal of Political Philosophy
11 (2003), 437; A. Follesdal and S. Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deﬁcit in the EU:
A response to Majone and Moravcsik’, JCMS 44 (2006), 533.
10 A. Hemerijck, ‘The self-transformation of the European Social Model(s)’ in G. Esping-
Andersen (ed.),WhyWeNeed a NewWelfare State (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002).
11 S. Leibfried and P. Pierson, ‘Social policy: Left to courts and markets?’ in H. Wallace and
W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); M. Höpner and A. Schäfer, ‘A new phase of European integration:
Organized capitalisms in post-Ricardian Europe’,West European Politics 33 (2010), 344.
12 S. Gill, ‘European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic and monetary
union and alternatives to disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe’, New Political Economy
3 (1998), 5.
13 B. van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration
(London: Routledge, 2002).
76 nicole lindstrom
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/2521368/WORKINGFOLDER/SCKL/9781107006812C03.3D 77 [74–94] 14.3.2011 6:00PM
Yet the question arises: does the process of European economic
integration inevitably undermine social integration at the national and
regional levels? The work of Karl Polanyi provides a useful framework to
analyse the dynamic relationship between economic liberalisation and
social protections. In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argued that
every move towards market liberalisation is invariably accompanied by a
countermove to embed markets within societies. Describing the rise of
liberal market ideas in the nineteenth century, Polanyi argued that the
attempt by early industrialists to portray the ‘unshackling of the market’
as an ‘ineluctable necessity’ was a move designed to naturalise what was
an inherently political project.14 In other words, liberal proponents
sought to transform the idea of the ‘self-regulating market’ into a kind
of ‘inexorable law of Nature’ in order to justify abolishing barriers to
unfettered market competition.15 But Polanyi famously decried this
liberal creed as a ‘stark utopia’.16 Market economies are always and
necessarily embedded in societies. Those sections of society most threat-
ened by the expansion of the market look to the state to provide
protection. Failure to protect societies against market forces, according
to Polanyi, would lead to a ‘plunge into utter destruction’, the kind of
breakdown of social order that he witnessed from interwar Vienna.17
Writing in 1944, Polanyi thus sought to provide a warning of the dangers
of unfettered liberalism and a prescription for more social and sustain-
able ways of organising economic life.
Post-war leaders heeded such lessons. John Ruggie, drawing on Polanyi,
coined the term ‘embedded liberalism’ to describe this post-WWII order: a
compromise that sought to promote liberal international trade and mon-
etary regimes, but one predicated on embedding them within national
societies.18 This explicit compromise was institutionalised to varying
degrees and different forms in European social welfare states. European
governments pursued liberalising agendas at the international and
European levels. But they did so largely on their own terms.19 That is,
14 Quoted in J. Caporaso and S. Tarrow, ‘Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational institutions and the
transnational embedding of markets’, International Organization 63 (2009), 596.
15 F. Block, ‘Karl Polanyi and the writing of the great transformation’, Theory and Society
32 (2003), 275–30
16 Polanyi (n. 6 above), p. 139. 17 Ibid., p. 163.
18 J. Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the
postwar economic order’, International Organization 36 (1982), 379.
19 J. Best, ‘From the top-down: The new ﬁnancial architecture and the re-embedding of
global ﬁnance’, New Political Economy 8 (2003), 360.
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states sheltered domestic industries from unfettered competition through
trade protections, economic subsidies and regulations and protected soci-
eties by providing generous social welfare and regulating labour markets.20
The objective of market liberalisation was thus subordinated to the goal of
preserving domestic social security and economic stability. This embedded
liberal compromise came under pressure ﬁrst with the breakdown of
Bretton Woods in 1971 and later with the passage of the Single European
Act. Since then governments have gradually ceded autonomy over a wider
range of economic policies to European and global authorities. Many
observers argue that this shift marks a ‘progressive disembedding of lib-
eralism’.21 In other words, the objective of domestic social cohesion now
appears subordinated to the principle of European or global economic
integration.
Yet Polanyi argued that efforts to disembed markets from societies
were ultimately unsustainable. Moves towards market liberalisation are
always met by countermoves to protect society from its negative reper-
cussions. A crucial question, however, is how we demarcate the boun-
daries of societies to be protected. Polanyi never provided an explicit
deﬁnition of society. Whether describing it as a ‘relationship of persons’
or ‘social tissue’ Polanyi’s notion of society was designed to offer a
holistic account of economic life that challenged the homo economicus
assumptions of classical economists.22 His empirical analysis of the
double movement in The Great Transformation was clearly national in
scope: how forces within British society reacted against the liberalising
agenda of British industrialists and their allies in the British state. In his
analysis of embedded liberalism, Ruggie also refers explicitly to the
reassertion of ‘national political authority over transnational economic
forces’ (my emphasis) as the foundation of the post-war embedded
liberal compromise.23 Yet if one conceives of society in broader terms
as ties that bind individuals together in economic and social life, then
nothing precludes considering how transnational markets might be
embedded in transnational societies.
20 D. Bohle and B. Greskovits, ‘Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorpora-
tism: Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe’, West European
Politics 30 (2007), 443, 445.
21 Best (n. 19 above), p. 363.
22 K. Gemici, ‘Karl Polanyi and the antinomies of embeddedness’, Socio-Economic Review 6
(2008), 22.
23 Ruggie (n. 18 above), p. 381.
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III Polanyi in Brussels? Transnational embedding of markets
Caporaso and Tarrow suggest that such a process of transnational
embedding is underway in the European Union. In an article entitled
‘Polanyi in Brussels’ they argue that rather than disembedding markets,
EU supranational institutions have sought to forge new social compro-
mises at the European level. The authors examine the ECJ as one
important agent in this process. Examining ECJ decisions on the free
movement of labour the authors suggest that the ‘ECJ is interpreting
existing Treaty provisions and secondary legislation in an increasingly
social way’.24 In cases such as S. E. Klaus,25 Bronzino26 and Mary
Carpenter27 the Court considered whether Member States have the
same obligations to workers and their families who cross nation-state
boundaries as they do to workers within their national borders. In each
case the Court ruled in favour of the worker. Caparoso and Tarrow
summarise the Court’s S. E. Klaus judgment as stating that ‘the working
life of the person concerned should be seen as a whole, and not just from
the limited standpoint of a particular job in one country, at one period of
time’.28 They conclude that the ECJ and other EU institutions are
emancipating labour-market exchanges from old (national) structures
and re-embedding them in new (European) ones.
Caporaso and Tarrow thus seek to challenge the pessimistic accounts
put forth by Scharpf, Gill and others that further European integration
will necessarily threaten the historic social agreements that protected
national societies from destructive market forces.29 New compromises
can be forged at the European level. These arrangements do not
necessarily have to recreate a national welfare state model on a supra-
national scale. Nor do they necessarily have to be channelled through
popular politics. Caporaso and Tarrow argue that the institutionalisa-
tion of social rights and protections at the EU level will be achieved
through the transnational mobilisation of a diverse set of societal actors
whose socio-economic demands cannot be met at the national level
24 Caporaso and Tarrow (n. 14 above), p. 611.
25 C-482/93 S. E. Klaus v. Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1995] ECR
I-03551.
26 C-228/98 Giovanni Bronzino v. Kindergeldkasse [2000] ECR I-00531.
27 C-60/00Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-06279.
28 Caporaso and Tarrow (n. 14 above), p. 607.
29 Scharpf (n. 1 above); Gill (n. 12 above).
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alone.30 This can include individuals pursuing their rights through the
courts.31 It can also entail non-governmental organisations, interest
groups, or social movements mobilising for expanded rights and pro-
tections at the European level working within and/or in co-ordination
with supranational institutions.32
Two problems arise. The ﬁrst is whether this loose coalition of individual
litigants and interest groups seeking stronger social protections at the EU
level constitutes a ‘European society’? In the thinnest Polanyian terms of
different cross sections of society mobilising to seek protection from the
market, perhaps so. Yet it is questionable whether such movements can
be conceived, or whether they conceive of themselves, in more organic
or solidaristic terms of ‘society as a whole’.33 Polanyi may be in Brussels
(or Luxembourg or Strasbourg). But he’s also in Stockholm, Paris and Riga.
That is to say that the ties that bind individuals within national societies
remain strong, far stronger to date than the ties that bind a European society
comprised of twenty-seven diverse Member States. Moreover, the more
citizens perceive EU institutions to be the primary agents pushing forward
the painful process of market liberalisation (a popular perception that
many national politicians are all too willing to nurture), the more we can
expect that countermovements will be organised against the EU rather than
within it. It is important to note here that Polanyi’s conception of the
countermovementwas largely a defensivemovement: arising spontaneously
rather than following a coherent set of societal or political alternatives.34
This insight helps to account for the seemingly spontaneous eruption of
anti-EU sentiments across Europe that appear to have little in common
except a desire to halt the advance of Europeanisation.
This leads to a second concern. One might argue that a signiﬁcant
barrier to the development of a coherent social policy at the EU level –
and indeed the creation of a European society more generally – is the
diversity of national welfare state models amongst its members. These
differences are signiﬁcant not only in institutional or policy terms.
30 Caporaso and Tarrow (n. 14 above), p. 613.
31 L. Conant, ‘Individuals, courts and the development of european social rights’,
Comparative Political Studies 39 (2006), 76.
32 R. Cichowski, ‘Courts, rights and democratic participation’, Comparative Political
Studies 39 (2006), 50; D. Mabbett, ‘The development of rights-based social policy in
the European Union: The example of disability rights’, JCMS 43 (2005), 97.
33 B. Silver and G. Arrighi, ‘“Double movement”: The belle e´poques of British and U.S.
hegemony compared’, Politics & Society 31 (2003), 327.
34 R. Munck, ‘Globalization and contestation: A Polanyian problematic’, Globalizations
(2006), 180.
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Of equal importance, according to Scharpf are ‘differences in taken-for-
granted normative assumptions regarding the demarcation line sepa-
rating the functions the welfare state is supposed to perform from those
that ought to be left to . . . the market’.35 That is, citizens are attached to,
or are ‘embedded’ in, very different societal conceptions of the ideal
relationship between the state, market and society. These different
normative assumptions underlying national welfare states also carry a
high degree of political salience.36 Scandinavian leaders agreeing to
modify the core structures and functions of deeply embedded welfare
states often do so at their electoral peril. Tarrow and Caporaso conclude
that ‘whether national welfare states will be cut back, modiﬁed,
strengthened, or simply supplemented by social programs on a regional
scale has yet to be decided’.37 But this begs the question: decided by
whom? The future of the ESMs is not simply a matter of economic
imperatives but of ongoing political struggles. The pertinent question
then becomes how different actors – namely European institutions,
Member States and social partners – are engaged in struggles at the
national and European levels over the future of Social Europe.
The next section considers this question through an in-depth compara-
tive analysis of Laval and Viking. The Court’s rulings in these two cases
challenge Caporaso and Tarrow’s claim that the ECJ interprets existing
Treaty provisions and secondary legislation in an ‘increasingly social way’.
By ruling in favour of private ﬁrms seeking legal redress against industrial
action, the cases suggest that the ECJ may instead be interpreting existing
Treaty provisions and secondary legislation in an increasingly liberal way.
Yet a reading of ECJ opinions in dichotomous terms of a liberal versus social
leaning Court is bound to be analytically limited as well as inconclusive.
Indeed, for every case in which the ECJ appears to favour a market-making
interpretation of Treaties and secondary legislation, we can identify a case
where it interprets them in a market-shaping direction. However, rather
than viewing the Court as an independent actor in its own right or,
alternatively, as upholding the preferences of Member States, we can pursue
a more disaggregated approach to examine how the legal process enables
and constrains different sets of actors.38
35 Scharpf (n. 1 above), p. 650. 36 Ibid., p. 651.
37 Tarrow and Caporaso (n. 14 above), p. 612.
38 A.M. Burley, ‘Europe before the Court: A political theory of legal integration’,
International Organization 47 (1993), 41; K. Alter, ‘Who are the “masters of the
Treaty?”: European governments and the European Court of Justice’, International
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IV Transnational disembedding of markets? Laval and Viking
The overarching legal question at stake in the Laval and Viking cases was
how to adjudicate between two fundamental principles: the freedom
of establishment and the free movement of services and the right of
collective bargaining and action. The ﬁrst is inscribed in EU Treaties
(Articles 49 et seq. TFEU (ex Articles 43 et seq. EC) and Article 56
TFEU (ex Article 49 EC)) and the latter within the 2000 Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 28). At issue in each
dispute was whether industrial action by unions to force ﬁrms to abide
by nationally negotiated collective agreements violates EU laws oversee-
ing the free movement of services and the right of establishment. Given
that both cases involved ﬁrms based in old Member States (Sweden and
Finland) seeking to employ workers from new Member States (Latvia
and Estonia) at lower wage levels, the cases also involved political issues
related to enlargement, namely the legality of actions taken to prevent
social dumping. The following case studies trace the process through
which different domestic and European actors sought to inﬂuence and
frame the political and legal issues at stake in the two cases.
A The Laval case
In 2003 a Riga-based ﬁrm Laval un Partneri Ltd won a contract through
its Swedish subsidiary (L&P Baltic Bygg AB) worth nearly €2.8 million to
refurbish and extend a school in the Stockholm suburb of Vaxholm.
Between May and December 2004 Laval posted thirty-ﬁve Latvian work-
ers to carry out the contract. In June 2004 the Swedish construction
union (Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, hereafter ‘Byggnads’) con-
tacted Laval to argue that the Latvian posted workers should fall under
existing Swedish national collective agreements for the building sector.
By September 2004, Laval had not agreed to Byggnads’ demands.
Meanwhile Laval announced that it had signed a collective agreement
with the Latvian Building Workers’ Union that represented approxi-
mately 65 per cent of the Latvian workers posted to Sweden. Under this
Organization 52 (1998), 121; G. Garrett, D. R. Kelemen and H. Schultz, ‘The European
Court of Justice, national governments, and legal integration in the European Union’,
International Organization 52 (1998), 263; C. Carrubba, M. Gable and C. Hankla,
‘Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of
Justice’, American Political Science Review 102 (2008), 435.
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agreement Laval agreed to pay the Latvian workers approximately €9 per
hour, in addition to covering accommodation, meal and transport costs.
This wage was nearly double the average pay for construction workers in
Latvia. Yet it was nearly half the rate of pay for Swedish construction
workers in the Stockholm region. Under the Swedish national collective
agreement, Swedish workers at the same site would make approximately
€16 per hour, in addition to 12.8 per cent holiday pay.
In October 2004, ﬁve months after its ﬁrst meeting with Laval,
Byggnads announced it would initiate a blockade of the Vaxholm site.
Laval organised a demonstration at the Swedish parliament on 3
December to protest at the impending action. But to no avail. A day
later the blockade commenced, with Byggnads members preventing
workers and deliveries from entering the site and picketing the premises
with signs reading ‘Swedish laws in Sweden’. In December the Swedish
electricians union (Svenska Elektrikerförbundet) launched a solidarity
strike and unionised cement suppliers ceased deliveries to the site. A
month into the blockade, Laval went to the Swedish Labour Court
(or Arbetsdomstolen) to argue that the Byggnad blockade and the
electricians’ solidarity strike were illegal and should cease immediately
and requested compensation for damages. Two weeks later the court
ruled that the blockade was legal under Swedish labour law. In January
2005, other unions launched sympathy actions. By February 2005, the
Vaxholmmunicipality requested to terminate its contract. A month later
L&P Baltic Bygg AB declared bankruptcy. In April 2005, the Swedish
Labour Court referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The Latvian ﬁrm did not pursue its case in isolation. Swedish
employer associations were actively involved in supporting the Latvian
ﬁrm’s position in the case, not only politically but ﬁnancially. Svenskt
Näringsliv, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise that represents
54,000 Swedish companies, contributed thousands of euros towards
Laval’s legal fees in bringing the case to a Swedish court.39 The Latvian
Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked at the time, ‘Swedish lawyers are
queuing to help us.’40 Why Swedish employer associations and some
Swedish opposition parties aligned themselves with the Laval position
can be explained by internal political factors. Swedish employers have
39 C. Jacobsoon, ‘Baxläxa för Sverige i EU domston’ Dagens Nyheter (19 December 2007).
40 Diena, ‘Zviedriem būs jātaisnojas par pāridarījumu Latvijas celtniekiem’ [‘The Swedes
will have to defend themselves regarding the harm to Latvian builders’], 19 November
2004.
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long sought to secure more ﬁrm-level autonomy in wage bargaining
and increase the ﬂexibility of the Swedish labour market more gener-
ally.41 Thus the Laval case presented an opportunity for Swedish
employers to challenge existing Swedish labour and social policies at
the EU level.
With respect to the union, to counterclaims made by both Swedish
and Latvian critics that the Swedish unions’ actions were discriminatory
towards Latvian workers in Sweden (and foreign workers more gener-
ally) Byggands stressed that the action was designed to protect the rights
of all workers to fair wages and working conditions. To appeal directly to
Latvian audiences Byggands took out a full-page advertisement in a
Latvian newspaper displaying the hands of Swedish and Latvian workers
clasped in solidarity.42 The advertisement was met with contempt or
indifference by Latvian unions. The chair of the Free Trade Union
Confederation of Latvia argued that the advertisement was about the
continuation of the boycott, rather than a genuine appeal for solidarity.43
Representatives of the Latvian Union of Construction Workers, which
represented the Latvian workers in Vaxholm, expressed concerns that
Byggands had neglected to consult with them on the industrial action.44
The head of Byggands retorted that Swedish unions were reluctant to
discuss the case with Latvian unions since Latvian union ofﬁcials were
‘clearly under pressure by the Latvian government to support Laval
against Swedish union action’.45
In terms of the Swedish government, it waged a political battle on
domestic and foreign fronts. The government knew that Laval presented
a host of legal and political problems. Indeed, a 1994 report released
before Sweden’s accession to the EU had warned that many aspects of its
Swedish social model did not conform to EU law. Yet such concerns were
assuaged by an implicit understanding that the Commission would not
actively pursue infringement proceedings against Swedish labour and
social policies that may be in violation of EU directives. According to
41 J. Pontusson and P. Swenson, ‘Labour markets, production strategies and wage bargain-
ing institutions’, Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996), 223.
42 C. Woolfson and J. Sommers, ‘Labour mobility in construction: European implications
of the Laval un Partneri Dispute with Swedish Labour’, 12 European Journal of Industrial
Relations (2006), 49–68.
43 Diena (n. 40 above).
44 Diena, ‘Būvuzņēmums sniedz prasību Zviedrijas tiesā, valdība vērsīsies EK’
[‘Construction business makes a claim in Swedish court, government will turn to
European Commission’], 7 December 2004.
45 Diena (n. 40 above).
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Anders Kruse, the head of the Swedish legal secretariat who prepared the
Swedish position in Laval, it was only a matter of time before a legal case
would be raised.46 Laval presented such a case. Kruse argued that the
government had only one choice to make: ‘to defend the Swedish social
model’.47 Domestically the government faced pressure by Swedish
employers and Swedish unions. On the one hand, the Swedish employers
association accused the government of trying to pressure the labour
court to rule against Laval. On the other hand, when the government
publicly condemned picketer’s slogans targeted against foreign workers,
some union ofﬁcials publicly condemned the government for abandon-
ing Swedish workers. With the Social Democrats losing to a centre-right
coalition in 2005, some trade unionists feared that the government
would change its position in the case. Such fears proved to be unwar-
ranted as the incoming government held steadfast to its position that
collective action should prevail over economic freedoms. On the external
front, Prime Minister Göran Persson argued during the blockade that
Swedish unions had the ‘right to take retaliatory measures’ in order to
‘ensure the survival of collective agreements’.48 Later, leading up to the
Laval hearings, in 2006 the Swedish government invited the agents of all
the Member States to a special information meeting in the lead up to the
Laval hearings aimed at presenting the Swedish position on the issues
raised in the case. ‘We were concerned that other member states didn’t
understand the Swedish social model’, Kruse explains, ‘so we invited
them to come to Stockholm and ask questions.’49
While the ECJ considered the case, political debates continued outside
the courts. In December 2005 then EU Commissioner for the Internal
Market and Services, Charles McCreevy, announced during a visit to
Stockholm that he would oppose the Swedish government and Byggand
position in the ECJ case, arguing that the Swedish unions’ action against
Laval violated free movement of services.50 McCreevy’s comments pro-
voked outrage among trade unions across Europe, as well as among
Swedish and Danish social democrats. Given that Denmark’s industrial
relations model is quite similar to Sweden’s – based on voluntary col-
lective bargaining rather than mandatory minimum wages – Danish
actors weighed in on the impending decision. Former Danish Prime
46 Personal interview, Gothenburg, Sweden, 19 March 2009. 47 Personal interview.
48 Quoted Woolfson and Sommers (n. 42 above), p. 55. 49 Personal interview.
50 Carsten Jørgensen, ‘Swedish case referred to ECJ has major importance for the Danish
model’, EIROnline (2004), www.eurofond.europa.eu/eiro/2005/11/feature/dk0511102f.htm.
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Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen suggested that McCreevy’s comment
had seriously undermined Swedish and Danish support for the EU.51
This view that the dispute might have wider implications for Swedish
support of the EUmore generally was reinforced by the Swedish employ-
ment minister’s comment that the question of Sweden’s withdrawal from
the EU would be raised. ‘There are a lot of people out there’, he said, ‘who
voted for EU entry in the belief that the Swedish model would stay
intact.’52 When the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) asked
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to clarify whether
McCreevy’s comments reﬂected the view of the European Commission
as whole, Barroso responded that ‘In no way are we going against or
criticizing the Swedish social model.’53 When asked in a European
Parliament hearing on the dispute to expand on his position, McGreevy
remarked: ‘Latvian trade union members are entitled to have their interests
defended asmuch as Swedish trade unionmembers . . . The real issue to me
is what we mean by an internal market.’54
In its December 2007 decision, the ECJ recognised that the right of trade
unions to take collective action is a fundamental right under Community
law – and that the right to take collective action for the protection of
workers against social dumping might constitute an overriding reason of
public interest. However, the ECJ deemed that in the Laval case the Swedish
unions’ boycott violated the principle of freedom to provide services since
the unions’ demands exceeded minimal protections under national labour
law. The ECJ decision thus reafﬁrmed the right to take industrial action
under EU law, but was a blow to Sweden’s voluntary collective bargaining
system. The Swedish government expressed disappointment in the ruling.
Swedish employment minister Sven Otto Littorin told the Financial Times
that the centre-right government, which had supported the unions in the
dispute, would now have to amend the law. ‘I’m a bit surprised and a bit
disappointed by the verdict’, he said. ‘I think things are working well as they
are.’55 Andres Kruse remarked: ‘The free movement of services cannot take
precedence over such fundamental rights as negotiating a collective agree-
ment or staging an industrial action.’56
51 S. James, ‘Sweden: Lessons of the Vaxholm builders’ dispute’, World Socialist Web
(2006), www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jun2006/swed-j27_prn.shtml.
52 James (n. 51 above). 53 Ibid.
54 EurActiv, ‘McGreevy defends stance in social model row’, 26 October 2005, www.euractiv.
com/en/socialeurope/mccreevy-defends-stance-social-model-row/article-146475.
55 Financial Times, ‘Europe loses when it legitimates low wages’, 7 March 2008.
56 BBC News, ‘Latvian ﬁrm test EU labour laws’, 9 January 2007.
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Supporters of Laval’s position voiced satisfaction with the ruling. The
key counsel for Laval, Anders Elme´r, remarked in the Swedish daily
Dagens Nyheter that the ruling vindicated Laval’s opposition to the
blockade.57 Svenskt Näringsliv also welcomed the decision. Its vice-
president, Jan-Peter Duker, said: ‘This is good for free movement of
services. You can’t raise obstacles for foreign companies to come to
Sweden.’58 Latvian public ofﬁcials also weighed in on the debate.
Latvian European Parliament Member Valdis Dombrovskis of the
centre-right EPP-ED group suggested that the EU should consider put-
ting protective mechanisms in place to safeguard companies that post
workers from the ‘arbitrary and unjustiﬁed demands of trade unions’
and argued that ‘the Laval ruling will shape the direction of the single
market in the future’.59 Jorgen Ronnest of the employers association
Business Europe struck a more cautious note. While the ECJ ruling will
contribute to ‘improving the development of an internal market’ by
forcing legal clarity, Ronnest argued, policy-makers should ﬁrst ‘wait
for member states to draw their own conclusions on what [the Laval and
Viking judgments] mean for their national systems’ – and ‘only then we
can see whether something has to be done at EU level’.60
Swedish labour unions, Swedish opposition parties and the ETUC con-
demned the ruling. While many commentators made a point of emphasis-
ing that the ECJ had upheld the fundamental right to strike – as well as to
take actions to preserve national protections against social dumping – they
concurred that the ECJ ruling presented a setback to the Swedish collective
bargaining system and the ESM more generally. Speaking in front of a
packed audience at a 26 February 2008 hearing before the European
Parliament’s Employee and Social Affairs Committee on the Laval and
Viking cases, ETUC General Secretary John Monks argued that the rulings
challenge ‘by accident or by design’ the European Parliament’s position that
the Services Directive places fundamental social rights and free movement
of services on an equal footing. He remarks:
The idea of social Europe has taken a blow. Put simply, the action of
employers using free movement as a pretext for social dumping practices
is resulting in unions having to justify, ultimately to the courts, the
57 O. Carp, ‘Motgång för Byggands i EU-dom’, Dagens Nyheter, 18 December 2007.
58 Jacobsoon (n. 39 above).
59 EurActive, ‘European Social Model challenged by court rulings’, 27 February 2008, www.eur
oactive.com/en/socialeurope/european-social-model-challenged-court-rulings/article-170567.
60 Ibid.
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actions they take against those employers’ tactics. That is both wrong and
dangerous. Wrong because workers’ rights to equal treatment in the host
country should be the guiding principle. Wrong because unions must be
autonomous. And dangerous because it reinforces those critics of Europe
who have long said that liberal Europe would always threaten the gen-
erally excellent social, collective bargaining and welfare systems built up
since the Second World War.61
The Latvian unions had been relatively silent during the course of the
dispute. Yet after the ruling, the president of the Latvian Free Trade
Union Confederation, Peteris Krigers, remarked that the ECJ ruling
would require unions to improve their cross-border communication
channels.62
B The Viking case
In October 2003, Viking Line, a Finnish ferry company, gave the Finnish
Seamen’s Union (or Suomen Merimies-Unioni, FSU) notice of its inten-
tion to reﬂag its passenger vessel Rosella. One of seven Viking vessels,
Rosella runs routes from Sweden and Finland through the Baltic Sea
archipelago to the Estonian capital Tallinn. Viking argued that in order
to compete with other ferries operating on the same route, it intended to
register the vessel in Estonia, where it had a subsidiary, and employ an
Estonian crew. Replacing the Finnish crew with an Estonian one prom-
ised to reduce Viking’s labour costs signiﬁcantly due to the far lower
levels of pay in Estonia than in Finland. Once the existing collective
agreement between Viking and the FSU expired on 17 November 2003,
the FSU was no longer under the Finnish legal obligation to maintain
industrial peace and soon after gave notice of its intention to strike in
order to prevent the reﬂagging. The union put forth two conditions to
renew the collective agreement: (1) that regardless of a possible change of
ﬂags on Rosella Viking would continue to follow Finnish laws and
Finnish collective bargaining agreements and (2) that any change of
ﬂag would not lead to any redundancy and lay-offs of current employees
or change in terms and conditions of employment without union con-
sent. The FSU justiﬁed its position in press statements by arguing that
they were seeking to protect Finnish jobs.
61 European Parliament, Hearing of Committee of Employment and Social Affairs, 26
February 2008.
62 Michael Whittal, ‘Unions fear ECJ ruling in Laval case could lead to social dumping’
(2008), www.eurofond.europa.eu/eiro/2008/01/articles/eu0801019i.htm.
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The dispute soon took on a transnational dimension. Responding to a
request for support from FSU, in November 2003 the London-based
International TransportWorker’s Federation (ITF) distributed a circular
to all of its afﬁliates requesting that they refrain from negotiating with
Viking line and threatening a boycott of all Viking Line vessels if they
failed to comply. ITF, which represents 600 afﬁliated unions in 140
countries, had long campaigned against the use of ‘ﬂags of convenience’
(or FOC). This policy seeks to establish genuine links between the
nationality of ship owners and the vessel ﬂag – in other words, combat-
ing the prevalent use of ﬂags from tax and regulatory havens – and to
enhance the conditions of seafarers on FOC ships. When Viking learned
of the ITF circular it immediately sought an injunction to restrain ITF
and FSU from the strike action. In the course of conciliation meetings
Viking agreed that any reﬂagging would not lead to lay-offs. Yet the ITF
and FSU refused to withdraw its circular.
A year later, in November 2005, Viking Line brought a case against the
ITF in theUK courts. Viking could bring the case before theUK courts since
its main objection was against the boycott threatened by ITF, which is
headquartered in London. Viking claimed that the ITF, by threatening a
boycott, infringed Viking’s right of establishment with regard to the reﬂag-
ging of the Rosella. The UK commercial court ruled in Viking’s favour,
granting an injunction against the unions. The ITF and FSU appealed
the decision in the UK Court of Appeal, which subsequently lifted
the injunction and referred a series of questions to the ECJ to resolve. The
questions were twofold: (1) whether collective action falls outside the
scope of Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) – that is, whether the free
movement of maritime services supersedes or is constrained by the right to
take collective action – and (2) whether Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC)
has a ‘horizontal direct effect’ in that private companies can appeal to
Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) in disputes with trade unions. In
essence, the UK Court of Appeal asked the ECJ to decide, like in the
Laval case, how to strike an appropriate balance between the right to take
collective action and the fundamental freedom to provide services. ITF
summarised the stakes of the case as involving ‘an essential issue: whether,
and to what extent, industrial action by unions in order to prevent the
imposition of lower wage rates and terms and conditions of employment is
permissible when ships transfer ﬂags within Europe’.63
63 International Transport Workers’ Federation, ‘European Court to rule on landmark labour
case’, 10 December 2007, www.itfglobal.org/transport-international/ti27-viking.cfm.
normative and socio-legal frameworks 89
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/2521368/WORKINGFOLDER/SCKL/9781107006812C03.3D 90 [74–94] 14.3.2011 6:00PM
The ECJ held a hearing on 10 January 2007. Fifteen states and the
European Commission submitted observations in the case. ITF General
Secretary David Cockroft commented: ‘The number of submissions
shows how many states have recognized just how deep the impact of
this case could be, and we applaud the court’s determination to settle
it.’64 He continued:
What’s at issue here could hardly be more fundamental. The right to
defend your job against the right of a business to do what it takes to up its
proﬁts; a Europe for the powerful or a Europe for its citizens. This is not
about new entrants, or labor costs. It is about the rights and basic beliefs
that most of us have always believed underpinned the European Union.65
On 23 May 2007 Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro delivered a
preliminary judgment. Concerning the fundamental point of whether
collective industrial action falls outside the scope of Article 49 TFEU (ex
Article 43 EC), Maduro took a compromise position, arguing that EU
provisions on establishment and freedom to provide services are ‘by no
means irreconcilable with the protection of fundamental rights or with
the attainment of the Community’s social policies’.66 Maduro expressed
the view that trade unions could take collective action to dissuade a
company from relocating within the EU, so long as it did not partition
the labour market along national lines or prevent a relocated company
from providing services in another Member State. Departing from the
Commission’s submitted opinion in the case, Maduro argued that
Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) does have a horizontal effect, giving
an employer the right to pursue a claim against a trade union for
violating free movement of services and the right of establishment.
However, Maduro argued that Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) does
not necessarily preclude a trade union from taking collective action to
protect the interests of its workers, even if the result of the action might
restrict free movement of services. The question of the legality of partic-
ular actions should be left to national courts to decide, according to
Maduro, provided that there is no difference in the treatment of national
and foreign companies. In a press release following Maduro’s opinion,
the ITF welcomed afﬁrmation of the right of trade unions to take
industrial action, but also expressed concerns that the ruling ‘might
64 ITF (n. 64 above). 65 ITF (n. 64 above).
66 Case C-438/05 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, delivered on 23 May 2007, 2.
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encourage businesses to believe that they can override those rights
through a kind of cross-border hopscotch’.67
On 11 December, 2007 the ECJ handed down its eagerly awaited
judgment. The ECJ stated, consistent with Maduro’s opinion, that col-
lective action may be legitimate if its aim is to protect jobs or working
conditions and if all other ways of resolving the conﬂict were exhausted.
Concerning horizontal direct effect, the ECJ argued that private compa-
nies can appeal to Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC) in seeking relief
from industrial actions. With respect to the Viking case, however, the
Court ruled that the strike action threatened by the two unions to force
the employer to conclude a collective agreement amounted to a restric-
tion of Viking’s freedom of establishment as set out in Article 49 TFEU
(ex Article 43 EC). According to the Court, FSU’s demands to force
Viking to abide by Finnish collective agreements made reﬂagging point-
less, given that the aim of reﬂagging was to reduce Rosella’s labour costs.
Put another way, if Viking was prevented from reﬂagging its vessel to
Estonia, then Viking, through its Estonian subsidiary, was denied the
freedom to compete with other Estonian-based companies doing busi-
ness under Estonia’s lower minimum wage rates and laxer regulations.
Yet the Court ruled that ITF’s policy of combating the use of ﬂags of
convenience could, in general, be interpreted as a legitimate restriction of
the right of freedom of establishment. The Court left it to the national
courts to determine whether the objectives of collective action can be
deemed proportionate to protecting workers’ jobs and employment
conditions and/or whether the action is in the public interest. If so,
then collective action can infringe on the right of establishment and
freedom to provide services. The ITF and FSU and Viking settled out of
court in March 2008, the terms of which were not disclosed.
V Concluding remarks
We can draw three sets of conclusions from this analysis. The ﬁrst
concerns the ECJ as an embedding or disembedding agent or, in other
words, the extent to which we can argue that Polanyi is in Luxembourg.
The analysis of the cases points to a basic but important fact that the
Court cannot initiate policy on its own; it must react to cases brought
67 S. McKay, ‘European Court gives preliminary ruling on union cases over conﬂicting
rights’, EIROnline (2007), www.eurofond.europa.eu/eiro/2007/06/articles/eu0706029i.
htm.
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before it.68 In the Laval and Viking cases, private ﬁrms appealed to the
ECJ to intervene in industrial relations disputes. This suggests that while
the ECJ may indeed provide new opportunities for individuals and
interest groups to seek social protections at the European level, this
opportunity also extends to private ﬁrms. Indeed, historically commer-
cial interests have exploited these legal channels far more frequently and
successfully to advance their interests at the domestic and European
levels. This appears to leave trade unions in the defensive position of
protecting national socio-legal frameworks against intrusions by the
courts. Yet in both cases unions pursued more proactive and transna-
tional strategies, with Swedish unions framing their actions as represent-
ing the interests of all European workers and the Finnish seaman’s union
joining forces with the international transport union. This suggests that
trade unions’ strategies are not only focused on preserving social bar-
gains made in Stockholm or Helsinki. Unions increasingly recognise the
need to invest in strengthening co-operation across national borders and
forging new compromises in Brussels.69
A second conclusion concerns the relationship between the
Commission and the Court in advancing European policy agendas.
Caporaso and Tarrow suggest that the Commission and the ECJ work
together to promote a social agenda at the European level, with the
Commission supplying the Court with a ‘concrete set of social regula-
tions’.70 Yet they can also join forces in promoting liberalising agendas.
The Services Directive passed by the Council and Parliament in 2006 had
watered downmany of the most ambitious proposals put forth by former
Internal Market Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein. But it also left wide
scope for advocates of service liberalisation to pursue this agenda
through legal means. If the Court looks to the Commission as a ‘political
bellwether’ then Laval and Viking could be viewed as quite consistent
with the Commission’s long-standing commitment to liberalising the
European service sector.71 It is also notable that the Court went on to rule
68 D. Wincott, ‘A Community of law? “European” law and judicial politics: The Court of
Justice and beyond’, Government and Opposition 35 (2000), 3, 21.
69 R. Hyman, ‘Trade unions and the politics of the European Social Model’, Economic and
Industrial Democracy, 26 (2005), 9; A. Bieler, The Struggle for a Social Europe: Trade
unions and EMU in times of global restructuring (Manchester : Manchester University
Press, 2006); K. Gajewska, ‘The emergence of a European labour protest movement?’,
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 14 (2008), 104.
70 Caporaso and Tarrow (n. 14 above), p. 614.
71 W. Mattli, ‘Revisiting the European Court of Justice’, International Organization 52
(1998), 185.
92 nicole lindstrom
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/2521368/WORKINGFOLDER/SCKL/9781107006812C03.3D 93 [74–94] 14.3.2011 6:00PM
in Rüffert (C-346/06) that a Land Niedersachsen provision that all public
contracts must conform to collective wage agreements constituted an
undue restriction on a Polish subcontractor’s right to provide services.72
This lends support to Scharpf’s claim that the most signiﬁcant challenges
to national labour and social policies do not stem from decisions made
by the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament but the initia-
tion of legal actions through the courts.73 But this leads to a ﬁnal
conclusion concerning the practical and political consequences of the
verdicts.
One outcome might be a process of ‘contained compliance’ whereby
affected states make revisions to existing laws to conform to the rul-
ings.74 Some have argued that introducing minimum-wage laws, or
making collective agreements legally binding, poses a threat to the
socio-legal principles underlying the Swedish (and Danish) social
model based on voluntary agreements.75Others have called for pursuing
secondary legislation that would raise the level of social and labour
protections now allowed under the Posting of Workers Directive
(PWD)76 or introducing a ‘social progress’ clause in the treaties.77 In
October 2008 the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for a
‘re-assertion in primary law of the law of the balance between funda-
mental rights and economic freedoms in order to avoid a race to lower
social standards’.78 In December 2008 employment ministers in the
European Council refused to consider proposals to strengthen the
PWD. Yet just months after UK ministers had rejected consideration
of the proposal in the Brussels, the government was faced with a wave of
72 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niederachsen [2008] ECR I-1989.
73 Scharpf (n. 1 above), p. 657
74 L. Conant, Justice Contained: Law and politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002).
75 I thankMarie Pierre Granger for bringing this point to my attention. See also ‘Förslag till
åtgärder med anledning av Lavaldomen, Betänkande av Lavalutredningen’ [‘Report of
the Committee Consequences and action in response to the Laval judgment’], Statens
Offentliga Utredninglar (12 December 2008), 123, www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/11/
74/43/5d1a903d.pdf.
76 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
77 Bercusson (n. 5 above); J. Monks, ‘European Court of Justice and Social Europe: A
divorce based on irreconcilable differences?’, Social Europe Journal 22 (2008), 26;
C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Informal politics, formalized law and the “social deﬁcit” of
European integration: Reﬂections after the judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’,
ELJ 15 (2009), 1.
78 European Parliament A6-0370/2008.
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strikes at home protesting the hiring of foreign workers at lower wages.
Former UK Health Secretary Alan Johnson referred to the recent ECJ
cases in his public response to the strikers’ demands stating, ‘As a result
of those rulings we need to look again to make sure our intention of this
free movement is actually being supported by workers themselves . . .
and it is not based on [workers] being undercut on terms and condi-
tions.’79 Societal countermovements seeking to defend national socio-
legal frameworks against moves towards further liberalisation are not
conﬁned to Member States with the strongest social protections to
defend but are increasingly evident among the EU’s most liberal mem-
bers. The question remains whether this movement can be waged at the
transnational level, spanning east and west.
79 Times Online, 1 February 2009.
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